Abstract Environmental consequences of natural resource exploitation often entail threats of future occurrences of detrimental abrupt events rather than (or in addition to) inflicting a damage gradually. The possibility of abrupt occurrence of climate-change related calamities is a case in mind. The uncertainty associated with the realization of these threats and their public-bad nature complicate the design of optimal economic response. We derive a Pigouvian hazard tax schedule that implements the socially optimal outcome. The tax is based on the expected cost of the hazard-generating activities and serves to reduce hazardous emissions well in advance of the catastrophic occurrence. A numerical example illustrates possible effects of the proposed regulation scheme. Implications for climate policy are discussed.
Introduction
Environmental Pigouvian taxes are based on marginal external damages. Yet, the derivation of such taxes for environmental threats, rather than actual damages, is not obvious. In this work we derive a Pigouvian hazard tax that restores optimality in situations where resource exploitation, rather than (or in addition to) inflicting gradual degradation, poses environmental threats concerning abrupt events triggered at an unpredictable future date by conditions that are not fully understood. Threats of catastrophic events are ubiquitous and their impact on economic well-being has been increasing significantly (World Bank 2006) . The sudden occurrence of such events is related to nonlinear phenomena such as positive feedbacks, hysteresis and the presence of thresholds that are prevalent in environmental processes (Mäler 2000; Dasgupta and Mäler 2003; Brock and Starrett 2003) . A case in mind is climate change. Gradual atmospheric accumulation of greenhouse gases (GHG) is thought to cause or accelerate global warming processes which may trigger catastrophic events (Broecker 1997; IPCC 2001; Alley et al. 2003; Stern 2006) . The uncertainty regarding the occurrence date and extent of damage inflicted by climate-change driven events as well as the common pool nature of the atmosphere hamper effective environmental regulation, as the ongoing debate regarding the Kyoto Protocol attests (Nordhaus and Boyer 2000; Nordhaus 2001) .
For the sake of concreteness we focus on the example of climate change, but note that the analysis extends to other exploitation-induced hazards. We consider an economy whose production activities use an intermediate input (energy) that can be derived from polluting (fossil) sources, which exacerbate environmental hazards, or from clean (solar) sources. The use of the former entails emissions that accumulate to form a stock (atmospheric GHG concentration) . No immediate harm is inflicted by the emissions per se nor by the resulting stock accumulation. However, the accumulated stock affects the probability of occurrence of a detrimental event. We refer, therefore, to the corresponding source of the intermediate input as "hazardous". What is the competitive temporal allocation of resources in the economy? How should the economy allocate resources in light of the hovering environmental threats? What kind of regulation can be used to implement the latter? These are the questions that concern us here.
To address these issues we develop a framework that incorporates occurrence threats of discrete events (as in Clarke and Reed 1994; Tsur and Zemel 1996; Naevdal 2006 ) within a multi-sector economy that derives inputs from hazardous and from clean sources. By contrasting the competitive against the socially optimal regime we derive the shadow cost associated with the public bad feature of the environmental threat and use it to determine the ensuing Pigouvian hazard tax. The latter, then, is used to specify a regulation scheme that implements the socially optimal allocation. Our approach differs from standard derivations of Pigouvian taxes by relating the tax to the (continuous) threat rather than to the actual damage, which is highly discontinuous in our framework. In fact, it is the competitive agents' contribution to increasing the hazard that must be regulated, not the hazard rate per se. In this approach, the proposed regulation scheme accounts for the catastrophic event well in advance.
Our work is related to the broad literature on environmental regulation and taxation (e.g., Bovenberg and Goulder 1996; Goulder et al. 1999 ), but derives mainly from the (growing) body of research on the economics of climate change (Kelly and Kolstad 1999; Nordhaus and Boyer 2000) . This research offers a variety of models, disaggregated by geographical regions, economic sectors and technologies (see also Chakravorty et al. 1997) . These integrated assessment models typically assume gradual environmental degradation and ignore the possibility of abrupt events. To allow a sharp focus on abrupt events, we simplify by considering an aggregate framework (as in Tsur and Zemel 2005) .
The economy
The economy consists of households that own capital and labor, a final (consumption) good manufacturing sector and two intermediate good sectors. The final good is manufactured by means of capital (K ), labor (L) and an intermediate input (X , e.g., energy) that can be derived from any of two substitute sources, which differ in the way they affect the surrounding environment. One intermediate input (X 1 , e.g., fossil energy) is hazardous in that its use involves emissions that accumulate to enhance the hazard of abrupt occurrence of some detrimental event. The second intermediate input (X 2 , e.g., solar energy) is clean and entails no adverse environmental byproducts.
The use of the hazardous input at the rate X 1 entails emission at the rate e(X 1 ) of pollutants which accumulate in the form of the hazardous stock Q according tȯ
where e(·) is increasing and δ > 0 determines the rate of natural decay. The environmental effect of Q is manifest via the hazard rate h(Q), such that h(Q)dt measures the conditional probability that the event will occur during the time interval [t, t + dt] given that it has not occurred by time t when the stock is Q. Let T represent the random event-occurrence time, with the probability distribution and density functions F(·) and f (·), respectively. For a given Q process, the hazard rate h(Q(t)) is related to the distribution
where
is the accumulated hazard.
Competitive allocation
We characterize here the allocation process when firms and households operate in a competitive environment.
The final good sector
The final good sector consists of many firms, each seeking to maximize instantaneous profit at any point of time. Firm i uses capital (K i ), labor (L i ) and an intermediate input ( Firms take as given the capital rental rate r , the prices of the intermediate inputs p 1 and p 2 , and the wage rate w and plan production in order to maximize the instantaneous profit (expressed with the final good as a numeraire)
and
is the (inverse) derived demand for the intermediate input, and is decreasing in X (since
. As the intermediate inputs are perfect substitutes, firms will use only the cheaper input if p 1 = p 2 and will use both (or be indifferent between using either) when p 1 = p 2 = p. Thus,
(3.5)
The intermediate good sectors
The marginal cost of manufacturing the clean intermediate good X 2 is assumed constant at p 2 ; the supply curve of X 2 is thus the horizontal line at the level p 2 . The hazardous input is manufactured with an increasing and strictly convex cost function Z (·) and its supply curve is the upward sloping marginal cost curve Z (·). These assumptions stem from the observation that fossil energy technology is mature and holds a dominant market share. Further increase in supply must resort to less efficient and more expensive sources. Renewable energy technologies, in contrast, are not yet fully developed and increased use may actually reduce prices. While the assumption of a fixed marginal cost may not strictly hold for all clean technologies (see e.g., Chakravorty et al. 1997 ) it serves here mainly to simplify the derivation of the optimal resource mix but hardly affects our main findings. The supply curve of the intermediate input is given by
The intermediate input market is in equilibrium when supply equals demand, i.e.,
Define X (k) to be the rate X that satisfies (3.7) for a given stock k and let X c 1 be the rate at which m(X ) switches from Z (X ) to p 2 , i.e., X c 1 satisfies (see Fig. 1 )
(3.8) 
We assume that Z (0) = 0 and Z (0) < p 2 , hence X c 1 > 0. Given k, the intermediate input is used at the rate X (k) and is allocated between the hazardous and clean inputs according to ( Fig. 1 )
both inputs are supplied at a price p 2 . We refer to the latter case as interior allocation and note that in this case p = p 2 and the allocations of X 1 (k) and
The instantaneous profit of the hazardous input sector is
where m(X (k)) = p follows from (3.4) and (3.7). The per capita rent generated by the X 1 sector is thus equal to
As the clean input is supplied at the production cost p 2 , no profit is forthcoming from this sector.
Households
Households derive income from interest on assets, labor wage and intermediate input rents.
With a representing assets, the household income at time t is given by r (t)a(t) + w(t) + χ(k(t)), which is allocated between consumption c(t) and savingȧ(t), yielding the budget constraintȧ (t) = r (t)a(t) + w(t) + χ(k(t)) − c(t). (3.12)
Consumption generates the instantaneous utility u(c) for some increasing and strictly concave utility function u(·). The present value generated by the consumption process interrupted upon occurrence at time T is
where ρ is the utility discount rate and ϕ(a(T ), Q(T )) is the post-event value, representing the maximal present value from the occurrence time T onward. Denoting by E T the expectation with respect to the random occurrence time T and using (2.2) and (2.3), the expected present value is evaluated as
incorporates the hazard rate into the effective discount rate ρ + h(Q).
The household consumption-saving plan is determined according to
subject to (3.12), given the initial stock a(0) = a 0 and possible feasibility (e.g., nonnegativity) constraints. In solving (3.15), households take exogenously (i.e., as functions of time) the capital and labor rental rates, r (t) and w(t), the capital process k(t) and the ensuing processes: the hazardous input rate X 1 (t) = X 1 (k(t)), the intermediate rent χ(k(t)), the emission rate e(X 1 (t)) with the resulting hazardous stock Q(t) initiated at Q(0) = Q 0 , the accumulated hazard (t) and (t). The event threat enters the household's value through the effective discount rate ρ + h(Q) and the expected post-event value h(Q)ϕ(a, Q). (Q(t) )dt measures the expected loss due to occurrence during [t, t + dt] given that the event has not occurred by time t. For example, a "doomsday" event that ceases all further economic activities entails ϕ(a, Q) = 0 with the damage v(a, Q). Recurrent events that destroy some amount D of the existing assets give rise to ϕ(a,
The Hamiltonian corresponding to (3.15) is (the time argument is suppressed for brevity)
and necessary conditions for an optimum include
Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the capital rental rate is such that saving equals capital, i.e.,
and the wage rate clears the labor market, implying, in view of Eqs. 3.2 and 3.5,
(We avoid nested dependence notation, such as x(k(t)), by using x(t) instead.) Substituting (3.18) in (3.12) and using (3.11) and (3.19) giveṡ
In view of (3.3) and (3.18), ϕ a (a, Q) = ϕ k (k, Q) and condition (3.17) becomeṡ
Conditions (2.1), (3.10), (3.16), (3.20) and (3.21) determine the evolution of the competitive allocation {k(t), c(t), x 1 (t), x 2 (t), Q(t)}.
Regulation
The public bad nature of the hazardous stock Q implies that the competitive allocation is suboptimal. We consider below the socially optimal allocation and offer a regulation scheme to implement it. To that end, we identify the external hazard cost of emission and use it to specify a Pigouvian hazard tax. We begin by characterizing the optimal allocation, maintaining that labor L is constant. Exogenous population growth and labor augmenting technical change can be added with minor modifications.
Optimal allocation
The socially optimal policy determines the feasible intermediate inputs and consumption processes according to
Suppressing again the time argument from all functions, the Hamiltonian associated with (4.1) is
where λ s , γ and µ are the costate variables of K , Q and , respectively. Necessary conditions for an interior optimum (with X 1 > 0, X 2 > 0 and p = p 2 ) include
and (recalling (3.14))μ
We assume that an optimal social allocation exists and use the superscript ' * ' to denote the corresponding optimal processes.
The Pigouvian hazard tax
Let
be the negative of the shadow price of Q(t), measured in consumption units. When the specifications of the hazard rate and the post-event value imply that increasing the hazardous stock Q is unwarranted, the shadow price γ * (t) is negative and β * (t) > 0. In terms of β * (t), conditions (4.4) and (4.5) that determine the optimal (interior) allocation of the polluting and clean inputs are written as
(The modifications for the corner solutions with X * 1 (t) = 0 or X * 2 (t) = 0 are obvious.) Comparing (4.10a) with (3.10), we see that β * (t) measures the unit cost of emission implied by the environmental threat, or the unit hazard cost.
We can now establish our main result.
Proposition 1 Taxing emission at the rate β * (t) and redistributing the tax proceeds as lumpsums implements the socially optimal allocation.
Proof Suppose that the tax is levied on the manufacturers of the polluting input, so the cost of supplying X 1 changes to Z (X 1 ) + β * e(X 1 ). The supply curve of the intermediate input at time t, defined in (3.6), becomes ( Fig. 2 )
and at an interior solution (with X 1 > 0, X 2 > 0 and m β (X ) = p 2 ) the competitive intermediate input allocation satisfies (4.10) rather then (3.10). (The same outcome is obtained when the tax β * (t) is levied on the final good producers that purchase X 1 .) The tax policy also changes the per capita rent of the X 1 -sector, defined in (3.11), to 
the per capita tax proceeds β * (t)e(X 1 (k))/L are given back, hence the household budget constraint (3.12) retains its form. The other conditions that govern the competitive allocation also do not change by the introduction of the tax, hence the evolution of the competitive processes under this regulation scheme is determined by the set of conditions (2.1), (4.10), (3.16), (3.20) and (3.21). Now, the social processes k * (t) = K * (t)/L and c * (t), with the corresponding social intermediate inputs and the ensuing Q * (t) and * (t) processes, satisfy these conditions (see (4.2)-(4.6) and recall that , x) ). Thus, the social allocation provides a feasible competitive allocation with a household value that equals the per-capita social value compare (3.15 ) and (4.1)). Moreover, any feasible competitive allocation is also a feasible social allocation hence it cannot yield a value in excess of V s (K 0 , Q 0 )/L (otherwise, K * (t) and c * (t) would not be optimal). It follows that the social allocation is also a competitive allocation under the tax rate β * (t), yielding the maximal feasible competitive value.
Remark 1 In view of Proposition 1, we refer to β * (t) as the Pigouvian hazard tax.
Remark 2
The proof above considers internal allocations. Corner solutions can be treated using similar considerations.
Implementing the regulation scheme requires the entire β * (t) trajectory, which, except for some special cases, must resort to numerical methods. Much insight, however, can be gained by considering steady-state outcomes, to which we now turn.
Steady states
Policy discussions regarding climate change presuppose a stabilized CO 2 concentration level, while debating possible stabilization targets and the different ways to achieve them (Manne and Richels 1997; IPCC 2001; Pacala and Socolow 2004) . In the present context, a stabilized CO 2 concentration corresponds to a constant stock Q, and a steady state implies that k and Q, hence also x 1 , x 2 and c, remain constant. Whether the competitive or social allocations converge to a steady state depends on the specification of the underlying functions (technology, utility, post-event value, emission and hazard rates) as well as on parameter values (δ, ρ, p 2 ). Here we assume convergence to a steady state (see Brock 1977; Carlson et al. 1991 ; and references they cite for discussions of convergence conditions), consider a doomsday event (with a vanishing post-event value ϕ), and compare properties of the competitive and social steady states for a particular economy.
Competitive steady state
Let the symbol 'ˆ' over a variable indicate its steady-state value. From (2.1) and (3.20) we have
Differentiating (3.16) with respect to time, using (3.21) and noting that ϕ ≡ 0 for doomsday events,
with the standard interpretation (cf. Eq. 3.3) that the interest rate on capital in a steady state equals the effective rate of discount. From (3.10) we obtain (for an interior solution)
Given the parameters δ, p 2 and ρ, and specifications of the functions e(·), Z (·), g(·, ·) and h(·), Eqs. 5.1-5.5 determine the five competitive steady-state variablesQ,k,ĉ,x 1 and x =x 1 +x 2 in the following way: For an interior solution, (5.4) definesx 1 and (5.1) reduces toQ = e(Lx 1 )/δ. GivenQ, (5.3) and (5.5) determinek andx. Condition (5.2), then, defineŝ c.
Optimal steady state
Conditions (5.1), (5.2), (5.3) and (5.5) hold also in the socially optimal steady state (with the superscript ' * ' denoting socially optimal variables), while condition (5.4) is modified to
We need an additional equation to determine the steady-state Pigouvian hazard tax rateβ * . Condition (4.3) impliesλ * = u (ĉ * )e −ˆ * (t) , whereˆ * (t) = [ρ +h(Q * )]t, while condition (4.4) implies thatγ * must diminish at the same asymptotic rate. Approaching a steady state, the transversality condition lim τ →∞ H s (τ ) = 0 implies also lim τ →∞ µ * (τ ) = 0. Integrating (4.8) from any t to infinity along the optimal path gives µ * (t) =−V s (k * (t), Q * (t))e − * (t) , which reduces at the steady state toμ
, which is readily 
Condition (4.9) defines the tax rate asβ * = −γ * /λ * , hencê
Equations 5.1-5.3 and 5.5-5.7 can be solved for the socially optimal steady-state variables:Q * ,k * ,x * 1 ,x * ,ĉ * andβ * . The dependence ofβ * on L stems from the public bad nature of the hazard: a unit increase in emission implies increased danger to the welfare of all L households. The marginal hazard term h (Q * ) in the numerator of (5.7) reflects the property that it is the agents' contribution to increasing the hazard that must be regulated by the Pigouvian tax, not the hovering threat (the hazard) per se. The latter is properly accounted for in the competitive allocation via the effective discount rate ρ + h(Q * ).
Numerical illustration
To illustrate possible external effects associated with environmental threats, we compare the competitive and optimal steady states for the economy specified in Table 1 . The constant labor force is normalized at L = 1 while the capital and energy shares (α k and α x ) are set to give a total share of 0.4 (leaving a labor share of 0.6). The intertemporal elasticity and utility discount rate are set at σ = 2 and ρ = 0.5%-within the range given by Arrow et al. (2004) . The constants u 0 and u 1 of the utility function u(c)
The competitive consumptionĉ is independent of the specification of u while using (5.8)-(ii) in (5.7) allows solving forĉ * . Givenĉ andĉ * , (5.8) identifies u 0 and u 1 (these are the values reported in Table 1 ). Due to the state-dependent effective discount rate, ρ +h(Q), the optimal policy is invariant with respect to the (positive) multiplicative constant u 0 but not with respect to the additive constant u 1 . This property is in contrast to the event-free problem in which the optimal policy is invariant with respect to both parameters (see Weitzman 2000) . A condition such as (5.8)-(i) forms the basis for the Linearized Hamiltonian, which allows to interpret the consumption rateĉ itself as the stationary-equivalent welfare measure corresponding to the value v(k,Q) of (3.15). The socially optimal counterpart is u(ĉ * ).
The steady-state solutions are reported in Table 2 . While the total intermediate input varies by only 12% between the competitive and social regimes, the allocations between the hazardous and clean inputs differ substantially (X 1 is reduced by 77% while X 2 increases more than 4-fold). The sharp reduction in the use of the hazardous input decreases the hazardous stockQ by 95% (from 18.75 under the competitive regime to only 1.02 in the social regime), which in turn lowers the hazard rate h(Q) by 94% (from 0.0017 to 0.0001). At a steady state with constant hazardĥ, the probability that the event will occur within the next n years is 1 − e −nĥ . Thus, the derived change in hazard implies that the probability of occurrence within the next ≈ 600 years under the competitive regime is the same as the probability that the event will occur within the next 10,000 years under the optimal policy (no small consolation when dealing with doomsday events). Indeed, the reduced threat leads to an increase of 8% in the annuity-equivalent welfare (measured by the steady-state utility) and to a 42% increase in total welfare (measured by the steady-state value).
The steady-state Pigouvian hazard tax isβ * = 3.29. At this rate the tax cost of the hazardous input,β * e(x * 1 ), amounts to more than 75% of its total cost:β * e(x * 1 )/[z(x * 1 )+β * e(x * 1 )] = 0.767. With the given functional specifications, this is also the ratio of the marginal tax rate (β * e (x * 1 ) = 0.115) to the unit input cost ( p 2 = 0.15). The analytic results derived above also allow to test the sensitivity of the optimal policies to variations in important parameters, such as the pure rate of time preference ρ. Repeating the calculations for the case ρ = 0.1% (as in Stern 2006) we obtain the high tax rate of β = 51.7, reducing the steady-state hazard stockQ to 0.0067, i.e., a mere 0.036% of its competitive value, by using only 0.67% of the intermediate input in its hazardous form. In contrast, the more conservative rate of ρ = 2% gives rise to the modest tax rateβ = 0.172, reducingQ by only 16% and leaving the economy to rely entirely on the hazardous input.
Although the numerical results are only illustrative, they suggest that the effect of the Pigouvian hazard tax can be significant. In particular the high sensitivity to the value of ρ is suggestive and can be traced to the observation that in this model regulation is aimed at controlling the effective discount rate ρ + h(Q), hence the relative magnitudes of the two discounting components are of utmost importance.
Conclusions
Environmental consequences of anthropogenic activities often entail threats of abrupt events in addition to gradual, tangible damages. As such environmental hazards typically bear public-bad features, they call for some form of regulation, which must be preemptive since it is too late to act after occurrence. While the presence of current hazards is well represented in the competitive solution in the form of an effective discount rate (indeed the hazard term is often proposed as a justification for nonvanishing discounting in long-term environmental management) the price of hazard generating activities should reflect also the cost associated with their contribution to advancing occurrence threats. In this work we identify this cost for a class of models, including greenhouse gas emissions that enhance the risk of triggering climate-change related calamities, and offer a regulation mechanism based on this cost.
The proposed regulation employs a Pigouvian tax schedule that, when levied on hazardous emissions, implements the socially optimal allocation. We solve explicitly for the steady state of a particular schematic case to gain insight on possible effects of the environmental hazard externality and the ensuing Pigouvian hazard tax rate. The results suggest that these effects can be significant.
The framework presented here is quite general and leaves a considerable room for extensions. Evidently, real-world applications will require refinement along the lines presented in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) , with multiple emission sources, each contributing differently to the environmental threat. While population growth and exogenous technical change can be included with minor modifications, the incorporation of endogenous technical change is more challenging. The latter extension requires to incorporate R&D efforts to reduce costs of abatement or clean (backstop) technologies (as in Zemel 2003, 2005) and the optimal regulation of such activities (as in Tsur and Zemel 2002) . Such efforts consume resources that could otherwise serve the production of final goods, but at the same time reduce future environmental threats. The decision on the timing and extent of these R&D activities should account for these tradeoffs. Another possible extension allows to learn and continuously update estimates of the occurrence probability during the process. In this case one has to account also for the information content regarding the hazard associated with each feasible policy. While learning and expectations have been incorporated within economic models of gradual environmental damage (e.g., Karp and Zhang 2006) , they are yet to be studied in the context of abrupt events.
